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Abstract
We provide a uniﬁed directed search framework with general production and matching
speciﬁcations that encompasses most of the existing literature. We prove the existence of
subgame perfect Nash equilibria in pure ﬁrm strategies in a ﬁnite version of the model.
We use this result to derive a more complete characterization of the equilibrium set for the
ﬁnite economy and to extend convergence results as the economy becomes large to general
production and matching speciﬁcations. The latter extends the micro-foundations for the
standard market-utility assumption used in competitive search models with a continuum
of agents to new environments.
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1 Introduction
Models of directed search combine frictions, which are seen as an important feature of labor
markets, with a signiﬁcant role for pricing, which is mostly absent in models of random search.
The main mechanism is that workers observe the oﬀer of each ﬁrm before deciding where to
look for employment and, as a result, they can direct their search towards jobs that they ﬁnd
more attractive. A common assumption in these models, known as the market utility property,
is that a single ﬁrm’s oﬀer does not aﬀect the workers’ overall expected utility. This property
facilitates equilibrium characterization because it allows ﬁrms to treat workers’ expected utility
parametrically; hence the moniker “competitive search” that is often given to this literature.
A natural question is what are the foundations of the market utility property? The underlying
idea is that a single agent’s actions do not aﬀect aggregate outcomes in a market with a large
number of participants and therefore any strategic interactions can be ignored. Ideally, of course,
this is a property to be proved rather than assumed. The standard approach for doing so is to
derive the equilibria of a ﬁnite economy, where strategic interactions are present and strategies
and oﬀ-equilibrium payoﬀs are well-deﬁned, in order to examine their limit as the number of
agents becomes large. So far this analysis has been performed in very simple environments with
risk-neutral agents, no informational or incentive problems beyond matching frictions, ﬁxed
productivity on the job and urn-ball matching (see Burdett, Shi and Wright (2001) for the case
of homogeneous ﬁrms; see Peters (2000) for the case of heterogeneous ﬁrms).
However, the applied literature has moved on to questions that require more complicated
environments in order to be dealt with in a satisfactory way. Examples of such environments
include introducing risk-averse workers (Acemoglu and Shimer (1999)), match-speciﬁc private
information (Guerrieri (2008)), endogenous choice of the intensive margin (hours) of work (Faig
and Jerez (2004), Rocheteau and Wright (2005), Berentsen, Menzio and Wright (2010)) and
moral hazard (Moen and Rozen (2007)). All of these papers use some version of the market
utility property even though it has not been explicitly micro-founded in their environments.
In addition, the empirical predictions of the urn-ball matching function perform poorly when
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confronted with data (Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001)) and many authors have used more
general matching functions which allow for a more ﬂexible relation between the labor market
tightness and the number of matches. In sum, the directed search literature has moved ahead of
its foundations in terms of both the production and the matching technology.
This paper’s contribution is two-fold. First, we propose a uniﬁed framework with ﬂexible
production and matching speciﬁcations and show that it encompasses most of the existing di-
rected search literature including all of the aforementioned papers. Second, we show that such
a framework retains suﬃcient tractability to analyze the ﬁnite economy where ﬁrms’ strategic
interactions are present and workers’ expected utility is not taken parametrically. This analysis
provides insights into the equilibrium of the ﬁnite market and, more importantly, it allows us to
extend the micro-foundations of the market utility property to a very general environment.
We consider a ﬁnite economy with heterogeneous ﬁrms, homogeneous workers and general
matching and production technologies.1 As in the earlier literature, we assume that frictions
arise from workers’ lack of coordination. The hiring process is formalized as a game where every
ﬁrm announces the payoﬀs that it oﬀers and each worker decides how much eﬀort to spend on
searching for each of the jobs after observing all the announcements. Lack of coordination is
captured by restricting attention to equilibria where workers follow symmetric strategies. In
such equilibria some ﬁrms receive too many workers (i.e. more workers search for this ﬁrm than
it has available vacancies) while others receive too few.
In our ﬁrst Theorem we prove that there exist equilibria in pure ﬁrm strategies if the pro-
duction function satisﬁes a simple condition, essentially concavity, and the matching function
has some weak regularity properties. We combine existence in pure ﬁrm strategies with conver-
gence theorems for the subgame of workers’ applications (Peters (1997)) to show that the ﬁnite
economy equilibria converge to the equilibria of the continuum economy with a market utility
property as the number of agents grows (Theorem 4). Pure strategies allow us to side-step
mixed strategy convergence which is much more involved and has only been performed in simple
1See the conclusions for a discussion of models with heterogeneous workers.
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environments with risk-neutral workers and ﬁxed productivity on the job (Peters (2000)).
Additionally, we provide characterization and eﬃciency results for the ﬁnite economy that are
currently lacking.2 Existence in pure strategies allows us to evaluate a ﬁrm’s strategy against its
competitors’ pure strategies which signiﬁcantly reduces the complexity of characterizing equilib-
ria. We prove that, under an additional condition on the production function, the compensation
that a ﬁrm oﬀers to its workers is increasing in its productivity (Theorem 2). Natural as this
result appears, the strategic interaction prevalent in ﬁnite economies means that it is not imme-
diate; indeed we provide an example where it fails when our additional condition is not satisﬁed.
We also show that the pure strategy equilibrium is unique when ﬁrms are homogeneous (Theorem
3) proving that the equilibria characterized in Burdett, Shi and Wright (2001) are indeed unique.
An additional application of our existence result can be found in Galenianos, Kircher and Virag
(2010) where it is shown that constrained eﬃciency does not obtain in ﬁnite economies, unlike in
continuum ones, at least for certain production speciﬁcations. This result is of interest because it
illustrates that the eﬃciency results prevalent in the literature (Moen (1997), Shi (2001), Shimer
(2005)) are due to the combination of directed search with a large market and that directed
search by itself does not deliver eﬃciency. We expect additional comparative statics and char-
acterization results to be within reach, and conjecture that adaptations of our approach can be
used to extend related ﬁnite settings such as Camera and Selcuk (2009), Geromichalos (2008),
Julien, Kennes and King (2005) and Lester (2010).
On a more technical level, we should add that the strategic interaction among the agents in a
ﬁnite environment makes the equilibrium analysis non-trivial. Speciﬁcally, the action of a single
ﬁrm aﬀects the payoﬀs of all market participants, which means that we need to keep track of the
full distribution of announcements when deriving the equilibrium conditions. Furthermore, it is
not a priori obvious that equilibria in pure ﬁrm strategies exist. For instance, Acemog˘lu and
Ozdaglar (2007) show that equilibria in pure strategies need not exist in a related environment
2An exception is Burdett, Shi and Wright (2001) who characterize ﬁnite equilibria for the case where ﬁrms
and workers are homogeneous. Montgomery (1991) examines a ﬁnite market but assumes that ﬁrms behave
competitively, essentially using the market utility property.
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where pricing and congestion interact non-trivially.3
Finally, ﬁnite directed search models resemble classical oligopoly problems. The demand
curve for a ﬁrm consists of the expected number of workers that want its job. It is smooth in
its “price” (i.e., the wage) due to the matching frictions. Even when there are more workers
than ﬁrms, the ﬁrms do not extract all rents because an individual ﬁrm has an incentive to raise
the wage in order to increase its probability of hiring. We contribute to the original motivation
for directed search models (Peters 1984, 1991) by characterizing the smooth demand system
(Lemma 1). This enables a deeper understanding of the interaction of competitive price setting
and matching frictions in ﬁnite economies and provides the basis for the other results in this
paper.
2 The General Model and Examples
We start with a description of the economic environment, strategies and equilibrium concept
and then state our main existence theorem which is proved in Section 3. The model is presented
in a suﬃciently abstract way to encompass a number of environments. Section 2.2 elaborates
on various applied examples in detail, illustrating how many of the production and matching
speciﬁcations that have been used in the literature can be mapped into our setting.
2.1 The General Model
The economy is populated with a ﬁnite number of ﬁrms and workers, denoted by 푀 = {1, ...,푚}
and 푁 = {1, ..., 푛} respectively, where 푚 ≥ 2 and 푛 ≥ 2. For production to take place, a
ﬁrm needs to hire a worker. All workers are ex ante identical and each of the (potentially
heterogeneous) ﬁrms can hire at most one worker. The game starts with the hiring process.
Then production takes place and payoﬀs are realized. The split of the surplus between worker
3In their model, prices and congestion interact additively while in directed search the congestion (probability
of trade) interacts with the price multiplicatively. Existence obtains in our setting for a large class of functional
forms for the trading probability.
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and ﬁrm is determined during the hiring process according to the posting game described below.
The payoﬀ of being unmatched is normalized to zero for both ﬁrms and workers. Firms maximize
their expected proﬁts and workers maximize their expected utility.
The surplus generated when ﬁrm 푗 ﬁlls its vacancy and provides utility 푣 to its worker is
denoted by 푆푗(푣).
4 The ﬁrm’s ex-post proﬁts (i.e. conditional on a hire) are denoted by 휋푗(푣)
so that 푆푗(푣) = 휋푗(푣) + 푣. Our ﬁrst assumption presents the restrictions that we impose on the
ﬁrms’ proﬁt functions.5 Illustrations of some economic environments that fall within Assumption
1 are presented in the next subsection.
Assumption 1 We consider environments where for all 푗 ∈푀 :
i. 휋푗(푣) is weakly concave,
ii. 휋푗(푣) is twice continuously diﬀerentiable,
iii. there are unique 푣푗 and 푣푗 such that 휋푗(푣푗) = 0 and 휋푗(푣푗) = max푣≥0 휋푗(푣).
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The Pareto frontier between a worker and a ﬁrm is linear (strictly concave) when 휋푗(푣) is linear
(strictly concave). In the case of strict concavity, utility is imperfectly transferable between
workers and ﬁrms. Note that it is possible for the proﬁt function to be increasing in the worker’s
payoﬀ 푣 at part of its domain, say when the worker has to exert costly eﬀort (see example P6
in Section 2.2). It is easy to see that, under Assumption 1, no ﬁrm has an incentive to make an
oﬀer below 푣푗 or above 푣푗 and therefore the space of utilities that ﬁrms might oﬀer to workers
is 풱 ≡ ×푚푗=1[푣푗, 푣푗].
The hiring process has three stages. First, each ﬁrm simultaneously makes a public an-
nouncement: It commits to the utility that it will provide to the worker that it hires. Second,
workers observe the announcements of all ﬁrms and each worker simultaneously applies to one
4In some environments, the worker’s payoﬀ within a match is stochastic. In that case, 푣 represents the worker’s
expected utility conditional on getting the job. See Section 2.2 for illustrations.
5These conditions can be rewritten in terms of 푆푗(⋅). It turns out to be more convenient to work with 휋푗(⋅).
6Workers’ individual rationality means that 푣푗 ≥ 0 is a necessary condition for a hire to occur.
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ﬁrm. Last, each ﬁrm goes through a recruitment process in which it hires at most one of its
applicants, and remains idle if it does not receive any application. Recruitment is anonymous,
i.e., each applicant has the same chance to get hired.
The strategy of worker 푖 speciﬁes the probability with which he applies to each ﬁrm after
observing some announcement v = (푣1, 푣2, ..., 푣푚) ∈ 풱 . Let 푝푖푗(v) denote the probability that
worker 푖 applies to ﬁrm 푗 after observing v. We focus our attention on equilibria where workers
follow symmetric strategies: 푝푖푗( v) = 푝
푙
푗(v) = 푝푗(v) for all 푖, 푙 ∈ 푁 . Such equilibria are
intended to capture the frictions of labor markets. We denote the strategy of workers by the
vector p(v) = (푝1( v), ..., 푝푚(v)). When there is no possibility for confusion, we suppress the
argument v to keep notation simple.
We now specify the recruitment process, i.e., the mapping from the application strategies to
the probabilities of ﬁlling a vacancy (for ﬁrms) and ﬁnding a job (for workers). The probability
that a ﬁrm ﬁlls its vacancy when each worker applies there with probability 푝 is denoted by
퐻(푝). The probability that a worker is hired by a ﬁrm where every other worker applies with
probability 푝 is denoted by 퐺(푝). We allow for general functional forms for 퐻(푝) and 퐺(푝) that
encompass a variety of speciﬁcations including the commonly-used urn-ball matching (e.g. in
Peters (2000) or Burdett, Shi and Wright (2001)). Several examples are illustrated in the next
subsection. The next assumption summarizes the structure that we impose on the matching
function.
Assumption 2 퐻(푝) and 퐺(푝) satisfy the following conditions for 푝 ∈ [0, 1]:
i. 퐻(푝) is twice continuously diﬀerentiable, strictly increasing, concave and 퐻(푝) ∈ [0, 1].
ii. 퐺(푝) is twice continuously diﬀerentiable, strictly decreasing, convex and 퐺(푝) ∈ [0, 1].
iii. 퐻(푝) = 푛푝퐺(푝).
iv. 1
퐺(푝)
is convex.
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Furthermore, deﬁne ℎ(푝) ≡ 퐻 ′(푝) and 푔(푝) ≡ 퐺′(푝). Parts i and ii ensure that 퐻(푝) and 퐺(푝) are
probabilities and they behave nicely. Part iii guarantees the consistency of the matching function
in expectation terms: the probability that a ﬁrm ﬁlls its vacancy is equal to the probability that a
worker is hired by that ﬁrm times the average number of applicants to that ﬁrm. This condition
links the probability that a ﬁrm hires with the probability the a worker gets the job and it
also implies that a ﬁrm that attracts no applicants cannot hire (퐻(0) = 0). Part iv adds some
structure to the relation between 퐻 and 퐺. Speciﬁcally, it implies that a ﬁrm’s hiring probability
is concave in its applicants’ probability of getting the job.7 This assumption is frequently used
in the search literature (e.g. Shi (2009)) and it is satisﬁed in many common speciﬁcations for the
meeting process, some of which we review below. In this paper, it is used to prove that workers’
payoﬀs are quasi-concave (Lemma 3).
There are two reasons behind our choice of a general matching function: First, it strengthens
our results by showing that they do not depend on the speciﬁcs of urn-ball matching. Second,
and more important, this paper’s aim is to provide micro-foundations for the applied work that
assumes more general matching functions such as Moen (1997), Acemoglu and Shimer (1999),
Rocheteau and Wright (2005), Guerrieri (2008), Menzio (2008) (see Section 5). It is worth
emphasizing that the strategic interactions among agents are retained in our environment which
is therefore strictly more general than the earlier literature.
A worker’s expected utility from applying to ﬁrm 푗 is given by 퐺(푝푗)푣푗. Utility maximization
leads to the following deﬁnition of the equilibrium in a subgame.
Deﬁnition 1 (Symmetric Subgame Equilibrium) A symmetric equilibrium in the subgame
that follows announcements v is a vector p(v) = (푝1(v), ..., 푝푛(v)) such that
∑
푗 푝푗(v) = 1 and
for all 푗 ∈푀
푝푗(v) > 0⇒ 퐺(푝푗(v)) 푣푗 = max
푘∈푀
퐺(푝푘(v)) 푣푘. (1)
7Let 푝 = 퐺−1(퐺ˆ) be the probability with which workers apply to a ﬁrm so that they get the job with probability
퐺ˆ ∈ [0, 1]. The ﬁrm’s hiring probability is given by 퐻¯(퐺ˆ) = 푛퐺−1(퐺ˆ)퐺ˆ, according to part iii. Using the inverse
function theorem yields 퐻¯ ′(퐺ˆ) = 푛퐺−1(퐺ˆ) + 푛퐺ˆ/퐺′(푝) and 퐻¯ ′′(퐺ˆ) = 푛[2퐺′(푝) − 퐺ˆ퐺′′(푝)]/(퐺′2. Finally, note
that 퐻¯ ′′(퐺ˆ) < 0⇔ 2퐺′(푝)− 퐺ˆ퐺′′(푝) < 0 which is equivalent to convexity of 1/퐺(푝).
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In words, for a worker to apply to ﬁrm 푗 (푝푗 > 0), he needs to receive a level of expected utility
that is at least as high as what he can get at any other ﬁrm.
Each announcement v leads to a unique vector of application strategies if at least one ﬁrm
oﬀers strictly positive utility. That is, when workers follow symmetric strategies, the subgame
equilibrium p(v) is unique given any v with 푣푗 > 0 for some 푗 ∈푀 (Peters (1984), Proposition
1).8 When v = 0 the workers’ strategy is arbitrary. From now on we assume that 푝푗(0) = 1/푚
for all 푗 ∈ 푀 but our results hold for any speciﬁcation of p(0). We deﬁne market utility to be
the expected utility that workers obtain in the subgame and denote it by 푈(v).
We say that ﬁrm 푗 is active when 푝푗 > 0 and it is inactive when 푝푗 = 0. In the former case
the probability that the ﬁrm hires a worker is strictly positive; in the latter case it is zero. Let
퐴(v) ≡ {푗 ∈ 푀 ∣푝푗(v) > 0} denote the set of active ﬁrms for a given v and note that it is non-
empty. The set of inactive ﬁrms is denoted by 퐴퐶(v). Following announcement v we can without
loss of generality reshuﬄe the ﬁrms’ indexes so that 퐴(v) = {1, ..., 푙} and 퐴퐶(v) = {푙+ 1, ...,푚}
if 푙 < 푚, or 퐴퐶(v) = ∅ if 푙 = 푚.
We now turn to the ﬁrms’ problem in the ﬁrst stage of the hiring process. Firm 푗 takes as given
the announcements of the other ﬁrms, v−푗, and the response of workers in the subgame p(v).
The expected proﬁts of ﬁrm 푗 are denoted by
Π푗(v) ≡ 퐻(푝푗(v)) 휋푗(푣푗), (2)
where 푝푗(v) solves (1). Proﬁts are uniquely determined given v since each announcement leads
to a unique set of application probabilities in the subgame.
We now deﬁne the equilibrium of this game. A directed search equilibrium is a pure strategy
Nash equilibrium in the game among ﬁrms with payoﬀs Π푗(v). Formally:
8Peters (1984) proves this result for urn-ball matching but his proof can be extended in a straightforward way
to our setting.
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Deﬁnition 2 (Directed Search Equilibrium) A directed search equilibrium is a vector of
announcements v ∈ 풱 such that Π푗(v) ≥ Π푗(푣′푗,v−푗) for all 푣′푗 ∈ [푣푗, 푣푗] and all 푗 ∈ 푀 where
the workers’ strategies are given by the symmetric subgame equilibrium.
We are ready to state our main result for the ﬁnite economy:
Theorem 1 A directed search equilibrium exists when Assumptions 1 and 2 hold.
The next sections provide examples, show how to prove this result and how to characterize such
equilibria. Readers interested in the foundations for large economies can ﬁnd those in Section 5.
2.2 Examples
This section illustrates that a number of production and matching environments that have been
analyzed in the directed search literature are encompassed into our framework. We ﬁrst look at
the production side and Assumption 1 and then return to the matching side and Assumption 2.
Production: The following environments have appeared in the directed search literature and
they diﬀer with respect to workers’ preferences, the production technology and the informational
structure within a match.
P 1. Canonical model. The canonical example of the directed search literature is the linear
production environment: workers are risk-neutral and ﬁrm 푗 produces 푥푗 if it ﬁlls its va-
cancy. In this environment each ﬁrm posts a wage 푤, the value to the worker who obtains
this wage is 푣 = 푤, the proﬁts of ﬁrms 푗 are given by 휋푗(푣) = 푥푗 − 푣 and the surplus
created when ﬁrm 푗 becomes matched is 푆푗(푣) = 푥푗. In this example the Pareto frontier
is linear. This environment is examined in Burdett, Shi and Wright (2001), Moen (1997),
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Montgomery (1991) and Peters (2000).9
P 2. Risk Aversion. Workers are risk averse, production is deterministic, each ﬁrm posts a
wage 푤 and cannot insure workers against unemployment. Denote the utility of a worker
who receives wage 푤 by 푣 = 휗(푤). The proﬁts of ﬁrm 푗 are given by 푥푗−푤 and the surplus
created when ﬁrm 푗 ﬁlls its vacancy is 푥푗 −푤+ 휗(푤). We can rewrite 휋푗(푣) = 푥푗 − 휗−1(푣)
and note that 휗−1(⋅) is convex due to risk aversion. Together with the requirement that
푥푗 > 휗
−1(0), this environment satisﬁes Assumption 1. This model is analyzed in Acemog˘lu
and Shimer (1999).10
P 3. Private match-speciﬁc information. Workers are ex-ante identical and privately draw
their match-speciﬁc disutility of work after matching with a ﬁrm. Firms post wages. When
the wage is 푤 and the disutility is 휙, the worker’s net utility is 푤 − 휙 and the worker’s
participation constraint implies that the he will refuse to work if 휙 > 푤. The worker’s
ex ante utility is 푣 =
∫
휙≤푤푗 [푤푗 − 휙]푑Φ(휙) where Φ is the disutility distribution. Un-
der the standard monotone hazard rate condition for Φ one can invert this relationship
such that 푤푗(푣) deﬁnes the wage that yields utility 푣 to the worker. Proﬁts are given by
휋푗(푣) =
∫
휙≤푤푗(푣)[푥푗 −푤푗(푣)]푑Φ(휙) and the surplus is 휋푗(푣) + 푣. It is not hard to show that
휋푗(푣) is concave in 푣 under the monotone hazard rate condition.
11 This environment is
analyzed in Guerrieri (2008).
9This environment has been extended to consider multiple applications by Albrecht, Gautier and Vroman
(2006), Galenianos and Kircher (2009) and Kircher (2009). In models of ﬁnite economies, multiple applications
lead to severe technical complications as shown in Albrecht, Gautier, Tan and Vroman (2005). See Julien,
Kennes and King (2000) and Camera and Selcuk (2009) for models where wages are (potentially) renegotiated
after matching.
10Notice that when workers are risk-averse, the optimal contract includes payments to workers who are not
hired (Jacquet and Tan (2010)). Most of the literature, including this paper, ignores the possibility of such
payments. One informal justiﬁcation for this restriction on the contract space is the (unmodeled) existence of
unqualiﬁed workers who are never hired but who would apply for jobs only to collect payments.
11Proﬁt 휋푗(푣) is concave if 푤(푣) is convex, which is equivalent with 푣 being concave in 푤. Since 푣
′(푤) = −Φ(푤)
we have 푣′′(푤) = −Φ′(푤) ≤ 0, because the density Φ′(푤) is positive.
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P 4. Endogenous intensive margin. Output is linear and disutility of work is convex in the
hours of work. Firms post an hourly wage 푤 and each hired worker decides how many
hours to work. The worker’s net utility is given by 푣 = 푤푡− 푘(푡) where 푡 is the time spent
working and 푘(푡) is a strictly convex function representing the disutility of work. This
expression can be inverted to 푤(푣) = [푣+ 푘(푡)]/푡 and implicitly deﬁne 푡(푣) when combined
with 푤(푣) = 푘′(푡) which is a necessary condition for optimal time allocation. When ﬁrm 푗
employs a worker at hourly wage 푤 it generates proﬁts 휋푗(푣) = 푥푗푡−푤푡 = 푥푗푡(푣)−푣−푘(푡(푣))
and surplus 푆푗(푣) = 푥푗푡(푣) − 푘(푡(푣)). A suﬃcient condition for the proﬁt function to be
concave is 푘′′′(푡) ≥ 0.12 This environment is very similar to the product market model
of Rocheteau and Wright (2005) and Berentsen, Menzio and Wright (2010) with buyers
instead of workers and sellers instead of ﬁrms. Our framework does not address the cost
of holding money which is a feature in these papers.
P 5. Endogenous intensive margin with private information. Consider the setting in
Example P 2 with two diﬀerences. First, worker’s disutility is 휙푘(푡), where 휙 is a disutility
shock that workers draw before deciding on the hours of work from some distribution Φ
which satisﬁes the monotone hazard rate. Second, ﬁrms post a (possibly non-linear) wage
schedule 푤(푡) that determines payments as a function of hours. Given the realization of
휙 the worker chooses 푡(휙) that maximizes 푤(푡) − 휙푘(푡) and his expected utility before
observing 휙 is 푣 =
∫
[푤(푡(휙)) − 휙푘(푡(휙))]푑Φ(휙). Given a level 푣 that ﬁrms want to leave
to the worker, they choose the contract 푤(푡) that fulﬁls the prior equality and maximizes
their proﬁts
∫
[푥푗푡(휙) − 푤(푡(휙))]푑Φ(휙). The proﬁt 휋(푣) is concave if 푘′′′(푡) ≥ 0. Faig and
Jerez (2006) examine this environment in a product market setting where a worker is a
buyer and 휙 corresponds to his marginal valuation for the seller’s (in our setting, ﬁrm’s)
12Since 푣 − 푘(푡(푣))푡(푣) + 푘(푡(푣)) = 0 deﬁnes 푡(푣), we have 푡′(푣) = [푘′′(푡(푣))푡(푣)]−1 ≥ 0 and 푡′′(푣) =
−[푘′′(푡(푣))푡(푣)]−3[푘′′′(푡(푣))푡(푣) + 푘′′(푡(푣))] ≤ 0. Then 휋′′푗 (푣) = [푥 − 푘′(푡(푣))]푡′′(푣) − 푘′′(푡(푣))푡′(푣)푡(푣), which is
negative when 푥 − 푘′(푡(푣)) ≥ 0. This is the case everywhere on [푣푗 , 푣푗 ]. To see this, note that 푘′(푡(푣)) is equal
to the wage that implements this utility, but only for 푥푗 − 푤 ≥ 0 the ﬁrm makes weakly positive proﬁts, which
deﬁned the range of possible oﬀers [푣푗 , 푣푗 ].
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good.
P 6. Moral hazard. The ﬁrm does not observe the worker’s eﬀort 푡 (moral hazard), output
푦 within the match is stochastic and the ﬁrm posts an output-contingent wage schedule
푤(푦). Output is given by 푦 = 푥푡 + 휙, where 휙 is drawn from some distribution Φ with
increasing hazard rate. Only the worker observes 휙 and he then chooses 푡(휙) to maximize
his net utility 푤(푦)− 푘(푡), where 푘(푡) is a convex cost of eﬀort. His expected utility from
a schedule 푤(푦) is 푣 =
∫
[푤(푥푡(휙) + 휙) − 푘(푡(휙))]푑Φ(휙). For a given 푣 there is a contract
that yields the highest proﬁt 휋(푣) to the ﬁrm. Also, 푘′′′(푡) > 0 is a suﬃcient condition for
휋(⋅) to be concave. Moen and Rozen (2007) analyze this framework.
Matching: We provide several structural examples of matching functions that can be used
in our framework. These examples diﬀer in the elasticity of the hiring probability with respect
to the number of ﬁrms in the economy and the elasticity of substitution between the expected
number of applicants and the number of ﬁrms. Consider the case when all workers apply with
probability 푝푗 to ﬁrm 푗.
M 1. Urn-ball. Workers send their application to ﬁrm 푗 with probability 푝푗. Assume that if
a ﬁrm receives at least one application, it hires one of the applicants. This results in a
Binomial distribution where ﬁrm 푗 has 푛 tries (푛 is the number of workers) and each try is
successful with probability 푝푗 (i.e. each worker applies to ﬁrm 푗 with probability 푝푗). The
probability that a ﬁrm has at least one applicant is 퐻(푝푗) = 1−(1−푝푗)푛. This speciﬁcation
has been used in much of the literature, e.g. in Peters (1991, 2000), Montgomery (1991),
Burdett, Shi and Wright (2001), Shi (2001) and Shimer (2005).
M 2. Qualiﬁcation shocks. Extend the previous example with a match-speciﬁc shock that
renders an applicant unqualiﬁed with probability 휏 (this could also represent the probabil-
ity that the application is lost in the mail, etc). In this case a ﬁrm has a qualiﬁed applicant
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with probability 퐻(푝푗) = 1− (1− (1− 휏)푝푗)푛, since the probability of a qualiﬁed applica-
tion is (1 − 휏)푝푗 rather than 푝푗 as in the previous example. This example is described in
Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) to deal with some of the perceived short-comings of the
standard urn-ball speciﬁcation.
M 3. Limited interview capacity. Consider example M 2 and assume that a worker needs
to be interviewed for a job in order to ﬁnd out whether he is qualiﬁed, but a ﬁrm has
only a limited number of interview slots. If the ﬁrm can interview no more than 푛¯ < 푛
applicants, then the probability of hiring of hiring is 퐻(푝푗) =
∑푛¯−1
푖=1 퐵(푖, 푛, 푝푗)(1 − 휏 푖) +∑푛
푖=푛¯퐵(푖, 푛, 푝푗)(1− 휏 푛¯). Consider the ﬁrst sum: 퐵(푖, 푛, 푝푗) =
(
푖
푛
)
푝푖푗(1− 푝푗)1−푖 is the Bino-
mial probability that 푖 applicants apply, and 1− 휏 푖 is the probability that at least one of
them is qualiﬁed. The second sum is similar, but due to limited interview capacity only 푛¯
of the 푖 applicants can be evaluated. Such a process is examined in Wolthoﬀ (2009).
M 4. Spatial search and CES matching. Other matching functions are feasible even though
they have not been explicitly micro-founded. One example that satisﬁes Assumption 2 is
퐻(푝푗) = 푛푝푗/(푛푝푗 + 푙) for 푙 > 0 which approaches the well-known telephone-line matching
function as the economy becomes large (see Section 5) and ﬁts the speciﬁcation in Ro-
cheteau and Wright (2005) and Guerrieri (2008). One way to micro-found this matching
function might be to think of 푝푗 as the fraction of workers’ search time in a particular
geographic area in the proximity of ﬁrm 푗, and the owner of the ﬁrm hires if he meets one
of the workers rather than one of the other 푙 people that are also in the neighborhood. It
is a special case of 퐻(푝) = [(푛푝)−휎 + 1]−1/휎 when 휎 = 1. This broader speciﬁcation fulﬁlls
our assumptions for all 휎 ∈ (0, 1) and resembles the popular CES matching function. We
expect many other speciﬁcations to ﬁt our framework as well.
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3 Existence of Equilibrium
The following three subsections are devoted to the proof of Theorem 1. First, we examine
the subgame that follows an arbitrary announcement by the ﬁrms and show that the workers’
probability of applying to some ﬁrm 푗 is quasi-concave in that ﬁrm’s announcement. Then, we
show that a ﬁrm’s expected proﬁts are quasi-concave in its announcement, 푣푗. Finally, we prove
existence by using a ﬁxed point argument which is extended to deal with the discontinuity in
proﬁts that often arises in models with a ﬁnite number of agents.
3.1 Analysis of the Subgame
In this section we characterize the workers’ response to an arbitrary announcement by the ﬁrms
v, and we determine how that response changes when some 푣푗 changes.
Characterization of Subgame: We characterize p(v) in two steps. First, we determine the set
of active ﬁrms. Then we determine the exact probabilities with which workers visit the active
ﬁrms.
Recalling that 푈(v) = max푗 퐺(푝푗(v))푣푗, we rewrite equation (1) as
퐺(푝푗(v))푣푗 = 푈(v), ∀푗 ∈ 퐴(v),
퐺(푝푗(v))푣푗 ≤ 푈(v), ∀푗 ∈ 퐴퐶(v).
To determine whether ﬁrm 푗 is active or inactive, compare 푣푗 with 푈(v). If 푣푗 > 푈(푣푗,v−푗), then
푝푗 > 0. Equivalently, 푣푗 < 푈(푣푗,v−푗) implies that 푝푗 = 0. Last, if the announcement of some
ﬁrm 푗 is exactly on the boundary (푣푗 = 푈(푣푗,v−푗)) then that ﬁrm is inactive (푝푗 = 0); if it were
active then 퐺(푝푗) < 1 which leads to 퐺(푝푗) 푣푗 < 푈(v) contradicting subgame equilibrium.
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To summarize these results, note that the workers’ market utility only depends on active ﬁrms:
if 푝푗(푣푗,v−푗) = 0 then 푈(푣푗,v−푗) = 푈(0,v−푗). The following condition determines whether a
13In other words, the correspondence 퐴(v) is lower hemi-continuous in v.
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ﬁrm is (in)active:
푗 ∈ 퐴퐶(v)⇔ 푣푗 ≤ 푣ˆ푗(v−푗) ≡ 푈(0,v−푗). (3)
We now focus on the active ﬁrms. In equilibrium, the exact probability with which a worker
applies to each of the ﬁrms in 퐴(v) is determined by the requirement that he is indiﬀerent across
them:
퐺(푝푘) 푣푘 −퐺(푝푙) 푣푙 = 0, ∀ 푘 ∈ 퐴(v)/{푙}, (4)∑
푘∈퐴(v)
푝푘 − 1 = 0. (5)
Equations (4) and (5) deﬁne a system F of 푙 equations with 푙 exogenous and 푙 endogenous
variables. The announcements vˆ ≡ (푣1, ..., 푣푙) of the active ﬁrms are the exogenous variables
and the probabilities pˆ ≡ (푝1, ..., 푝푙) are the endogenous variables.
Equations (3), (4) and (5) fully describe the equilibrium of the subgame. As noted in Section
2.1, p(v) is uniquely deﬁned when 푣푗 > 0 for some 푗 ∈푀 and we assume that 푝푗(0) = 1/푚.
Workers’ reaction to a change in a ﬁrm’s announcement: We now examine how the equilibrium
of the subgame changes when the announcement of ﬁrm 푗 is perturbed from 푣푗 to some 푣
′
푗. Let
v denote the initial announcement and suppose that 푣푘 > 0 for some 푘 ∈푀 . The case of v = 0
is treated separately below. We will use the implicit function theorem on equations (4) and (5)
but we ﬁrst need to determine whether the set of active ﬁrms changes, i.e. whether 퐴(푣′푗,v−푗)
is the same as 퐴(푣푗,v−푗).
Consider ﬁrm 푗 with 푗 ∈ 퐴(푣푗,v−푗) and note that 푈(푣′푗,v−푗) > 푈(푣푗,v−푗)⇔ 푣′푗 > 푣푗. When
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푣′푗 is “close enough” to 푣푗 we have that 푗 ∈ 퐴(푣′푗,v−푗). Furthermore, given any 푘 ∕= 푗:
푣푘 > 푈(푣푗,v−푗) ⇒ 푘 ∈ 퐴(푣푗,v−푗) and 푘 ∈ 퐴(푣′푗,v−푗)
푣푘 < 푈(푣푗,v−푗) ⇒ 푘 ∈ 퐴퐶(푣푗,v−푗) and 푘 ∈ 퐴퐶(푣′푗,v−푗)
푣푘 = 푈(푣푗,v−푗) and 푣′푗 > 푣푗 ⇒ 푘 ∈ 퐴퐶(푣푗,v−푗) and 푘 ∈ 퐴퐶(푣′푗,v−푗)
푣푘 = 푈(푣푗,v−푗) and 푣′푗 < 푣푗 ⇒ 푘 ∈ 퐴퐶(푣푗, v−푗) and 푘 ∈ 퐴(푣′푗,v−푗)
When 푗 ∈ 퐴퐶(푣푗,v−푗) we have two cases to consider. First, if 푣푗 < 푈(v) then ﬁrm 푗 at-
tracts no applicants after a small enough perturbation, the market utility remains unchanged (
푈(푣′푗,v−푗) = 푈(푣푗,v−푗)) and therefore 퐴(푣
′
푗,v−푗) = 퐴(푣푗,v−푗). Second, when 푣푗 = 푈(v) then an
increase in 푣푗 means that ﬁrm 푗 starts attracting applicants and the market utility increases:
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푣′푗 > 푣푗 ⇒ 푗 ∈ 퐴(푣′푗,v−푗) and 푈(푣′푗,v−푗) > 푈(푣푗,v−푗). When 푣푗 = 푈(v) and 푣′푗 < 푣푗, the market
utility is not aﬀected and the set of active ﬁrms remains unchanged.
Essentially, 퐴(v) is constant in 푣푗 unless some ﬁrm is exactly on the boundary for being active.
For a given v−푗, this argument implies that there are at most 푚 critical points for 푣푗 ∈ [푣푗, 푣푗]
where some ﬁrm (possibly including 푗) is exactly on the boundary. Let Ψ푗(v−푗) denote the set of
announcements by ﬁrm 푗 where some ﬁrm is on the boundary, given v−푗; similarly, let Ω푗(v−푗)
denote the set of announcements where 푣푘 ∕= 푈(v) for all 푘 ∈ 푀 (we occasionally omit the
argument v−푗 for notational simplicity). The lemma summarizes our results.
Lemma 1 The set Ψ푗(v−푗) contains a ﬁnite number of points.
Proof. See above.
We now characterize how p changes in response to a change in 푣푗. We will show that
푝푗(푣푗,v−푗) is quasi-concave in 푣푗. We ﬁrst focus on announcements in Ω푗 and then generalize
our results to the full domain Ω푗 ∪Ψ푗.
14Recall that 푣푗 = 푈(v) implies 푝푗 = 0 and hence ﬁrm 푗 is inactive.
17
Consider an announcement (푣푗,v−푗) where 푣푗 ∈ Ω푗(v−푗) and some perturbation v′ = (푣′푗,v−푗).
When 푣′푗 is close enough to 푣푗 the set of active ﬁrms does not change: 퐴(v) = 퐴(v
′). If 푣푗 < 푈(v)
then ﬁrm 푗 is inactive both under v and under v′ and therefore p is not aﬀected by a small
change in 푣푗, i.e. ∂푝푘/∂푣푗 = 0 ∀ 푘. If 푣푗 > 푈(v) , we shall apply the implicit function theorem
around F(pˆ, vˆ) = 0. The Jacobian of F with respect to (푝1, ..., 푝푙) is given by
퐷p퐹=
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
휉1(v) 0 0 ... 0 −휉푙(v)
0 휉2(v) 0 ... 0 −휉푙(v)
... ... ... ... ... ...
0 0 0 ... 휉푙−1(v) −휉푙(v)
1 1 1 ... 1 1
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
,
where 휉푘(v) ≡ 푔(푝푘( v)) 푣푘 denotes the change in the expected utility oﬀered by ﬁrm 푘 due
to an increase in 푝푘. The rank of this matrix is 푙: the expected utility of applying to ﬁrm 푘
decreases in 푝푘 and therefore 휉푘 ∕= 0 for all 푘 ∈ 퐴(v). As a result we can apply the implicit
function theorem to show that ∂푝푗(v)/∂푣푗 exists locally around v and that the matrix of partial
derivatives is deﬁned by 퐷vp = −(퐷 pF)−1퐷vF. The following lemma describes our result:
Lemma 2 (Workers’ response to a perturbation in the announcements) When 푣푗 ∈ Ω푗(v−푗)
and 푗 ∈ 퐴(v) a change in 푣푗 leads to
∂푝푗(v)
∂푣푗
= 푇푗(v)
−1 퐺(푝푗(v)), (6)
where 푇푗(v) = −휉푗(v)− [
∑
푘∈퐴( v)∖{푗} 휉푘(v)
−1]−1.
Proof. See the appendix.
Finally, when v−푗 = 0−푗 we have 푝푗(푣푗,0−푗) = 1/푚 for 푣푗 = 0 and 푝푗(푣푗,0−푗) = 1 for 푣푗 > 0.
Similarly, for all 푘 ∕= 푗 we have 푝푘(0) = 1/푚 when 푣푗 = 0 and 푝푘(v) = 0 when 푣푗 > 0. In other
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words, 푝푗(푣푗,0−푗) is discontinuous at 푣푗 = 0 and 0 ∈ Ψ푗(0−푗).
This characterization result is key to our analysis. It describes the change in the workers’
probability of applying for a particular job when the ﬁrm changes its announcement. It has a
clear economic interpretation. First, the response is stronger if the probability of getting the job
퐺(푝푗) is higher. Clearly, a given increase in 푣 translates into a higher gain for an individual worker
when the job is easier to get in the ﬁrst place. The response is negatively related to the marginal
beneﬁt ∣휉푗(v)∣. A large ∣휉푗(v)∣ means that an increase in the application probability at ﬁrm 푗
diminishes the workers’ utility from applying to ﬁrm 푗 by a large amount. In that case a small
increase of the application probabilities by workers is suﬃcient to equalize the expected utilities
across all ﬁrms. Similarly, the strength of the response is negatively related to the marginal
beneﬁt ∣휉푘(v)∣ at some other ﬁrm 푘. When ﬁrm 푗 improves its announcement, workers apply
more to 푗 and less to other ﬁrms. If the expected utility of applying to other ﬁrms improves
quickly, then workers shift only little additional application probability to ﬁrm 푗 before the
expected utilities across ﬁrms is again equalized. Therefore, the response by workers is related
in a tractable way to the change of expected utility of the current ﬁrm and its competitors. Note
that the components of workers’ response that relate to ﬁrm 푘 ∕= 푗 arise because of the strategic
interactions across ﬁrms.
We use Lemma 2 to prove 푝푗 is quasi-concave on the full domain of announcements. In
particular when v−푗 ∕= 0−푗 the application probability 푝푗(푣푗,v−푗) is equal to zero for 푣푗 ≤ 푣ˆ푗(v−푗)
and it is strictly concave for 푣푗 ≥ 푣ˆ푗(v−푗). When v−푗 = 0−푗 the application probability is
discontinuous at 푣푗 = 0 with 푝푗(0,0−푗) = 1/푚 and 푝푗(푣푗,0−푗) = 1 for 푣푗 > 0.
Lemma 3 The application probability 푝푗(푣푗,v−푗) is quasi-concave in 푣푗 for given v−푗.
Proof. See the appendix.
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3.2 Analysis of ﬁrms’ strategies
We now analyze how proﬁts change when a ﬁrm’s announcement is perturbed. The goal is to
prove the quasi-concavity of expected proﬁts.
Consider ﬁrm 푗 and ﬁx the other ﬁrms’ announcement v−푗. We ﬁrst focus on 푣푗 ∈ Ω푗(v−푗)
and we describe how to extend our results to 푣푗 ∈ Ψ푗(v−푗) below (the case of v−푗 = 0 is
treated separately). If 푣푗 < 푣ˆ푗(v−푗) then ﬁrm 푗 is inactive, its expected proﬁts are zero and
∂Π푗( v)/∂푣푗 = 0. If 푣푗 > 푣ˆ푗(v−푗) then ﬁrm 푗 is active and the ﬁrst derivative of its expected
proﬁts with respect to its own announcement is
∂Π푗(푣푗,v−푗)
∂푣푗
= 퐻(푝푗(푣푗,v−푗))
푑휋푗(푣푗)
푑푣푗
+ ℎ(푝푗(푣푗,v−푗))휋푗(푣푗)
∂푝푗(푣푗,v−푗)
∂푣푗
. (7)
The second derivative is
∂2Π푗(푣푗,v−푗)
∂푣2푗
= 퐻(푝푗(푣푗,v−푗))
푑2휋푗(푣푗)
푑푣2푗
+ 2 ℎ(푝푗(푣푗,v−푗))
푑휋푗(푣푗)
푑푣푗
∂푝푗(푣푗,v−푗)
∂푣푗
+ ℎ′(푝푗(푣푗,v−푗))
(∂푝푗(푣푗,v−푗)
∂푣푗
)2
휋푗(푣푗) + ℎ(푝푗(푣푗,v−푗))휋푗(푣푗)
∂2푝푗(푣푗,v−푗)
∂푣2푗
.(8)
It is not hard to see that equation (8) is negative. The ﬁrst term is weakly negative since 휋푗 is
weakly concave. The second term is weakly negative since 휋푗 is weakly decreasing on [푣푗, 푣푗],
ℎ(푝푗) > 0 and ∂푝푖/∂푣푖 > 0. The third term is non-positive since ℎ
′(푝푖) ≤ 0, and the fourth
term is strictly negative because of ∂2푝푖/∂푣
2
푖 < 0. Therefore, expected proﬁts Π푗 are strictly
concave on (푣ˆ푗(v−푗), 푣푗) ∩ Ω푗(v−푗). This result can be extended to the elements in Ψ푗(v−푗)
using the same arguments as in the proof of Lemma 3. When v−푗 = 0, the expected proﬁts of
ﬁrm 푗 are discontinuous at 푣푗 = 0 due to the discontinuity of 푝푗 at v = 0. More speciﬁcally,
Π푗(푣푗,0−푗) = 휋푗(0)/푚 when 푣푗 = 0 and Π푗(푣푗,0−푗) = 휋푗(푣푗) when 푣푗 > 0.
We have established that a ﬁrm’s expected proﬁts are quasi-concave in its announcement. In
particular we have shown that when v−푗 ∕= 0−푗 the expected proﬁts of ﬁrm 푗 are continuous,
equal to zero for 푣푗 ∈ [푣푗, 푣ˆ푗(v−푗)] and strictly concave for 푣푗 ∈ [푣ˆ푗(v−푗), 푣푗]; therefore, Π푗(푣푗,v−푗)
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is quasi-concave on [0, 푣푗]. When v−푗 = 0−푗, the expected proﬁts are discontinuous at 푣푗 = 0
with Π푗(0,0−푗) = 휋푗(0)/푚 and Π푗(푣푗,0−푗) = 휋푗(푣푗) for 푣푗 ∈ (0, 푣푗].
Lemma 4 Expected proﬁts Π푗(푣푗,v−푗) are quasi-concave in 푣푗 for given v−푗.
Proof. See above.
It is worth remarking that this lemma is not suﬃcient to rule out mixed strategy equilibria.
The quasi-concavity of ﬁrm 푗’s expected proﬁts is shown when the other ﬁrms follow pure strate-
gies. Under mixed strategies, the proﬁts of ﬁrm 푗 from posting 푣푗 is given by the weighted sum of
the expected proﬁts that result from each realization of the other ﬁrms’ announcement where the
weights are equal to each realization’s probability. Since the sum of quasi-concave functions is
not necessarily quasi-concave, we cannot rule out that ﬁrm 푗’s best response to mixed strategies
is also a mixed strategy.
3.3 Finding a Fixed Point
The ﬁnal step to prove the existence of a directed search equilibrium is to ﬁnd a ﬁxed point in
ﬁrms’ strategies. The strategy space, 풱 , is compact and the expected proﬁt function is quasi-
concave. However, as show above, proﬁts are discontinuous at v = 0.
When 풱 does not include 0, i.e. if 푣푗 > 0 for some 푗, then existence follows by standard
ﬁxed point arguments: the expected proﬁt function is continuous and therefore the best response
correspondence of the ﬁrms is upper hemi-continuous by Berge’s Theorem. Quasi-concavity of
proﬁts leads to a convex-valued best-response correspondence and Kakutani’s ﬁxed point theorem
ensures the existence of an equilibrium.
However, when 0 ∈ 풱 we have to deal with the resulting discontinuity. To prove existence
we use the concept of Better-Reply Security of Reny (1999). In our environment Better-Reply
Security means the following. Consider any v ∈ 풱 that is not an equilibrium announcement and
any sequence vℎ ∈ 풱 such that vℎ → v as ℎ → ∞ with limit payoﬀ vector (Π1,Π2, ..,Π푚) =
limℎ→∞(Π1(vℎ),Π2(vℎ), ..,Π푚(vℎ)). The game among ﬁrms is Better-Reply Secure if there exists
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a player 푗 and an action 푣˜푗 such that Π푗(푣˜푗, v˜−푗) > Π푗 for all v˜−푗 in the neighborhood of v−푗.
That is, if the original announcement is not an equilibrium then there exists a ﬁrm that can
always do strictly better even if the other ﬁrms slightly deviate from the proﬁle. When proﬁts
are continuous around v, this is trivially the case.
We only have to check the condition for the case when all ﬁrms oﬀer zero, i.e. at v = 0. For
any sequence of vℎ converging to zero there is some ﬁrm 푗 that in the limit has an application
probability below the average, i.e. 푝푗 ≤ 1/푚 and its payoﬀs are Π푗 ≤ 퐻(1/푚)휋푗(0). If ﬁrm 푗
oﬀers 푣˜푗 = 휀, then all workers apply to ﬁrm 푗 as long as 푣푘 < 휀/푛 for all 푘 ∕= 푗. So for every
휀 there is a neighborhood around the strategy of the other ﬁrms such that ﬁrm 푗 hires with
probability one. By the continuity of the ex post proﬁt function, ﬁrm 푗 can ensure itself a payoﬀ
close to 휋푗(0) for 휀 small enough. This is strictly higher than Π푗 because the ﬁrm can now hire
for sure and hence the game is Better-Reply Secure. As a result, an equilibrium exists by the
ﬁxed point Theorem 3.1 in Reny (1999).
This concludes the proof of Theorem 1.
4 Characterization of the Equilibrium Set
In this section we characterize the equilibrium set. We show that more productive ﬁrms will
in equilibrium oﬀer higher utility to workers under an additional assumption on the production
technology. Additionally, we provide an example where our assumption does not hold and the
more productive ﬁrm oﬀers lower utility. We then show that the directed search equilibrium is
unique when ﬁrms are homogeneous.
We ﬁrst need to rank ﬁrms by their productivity. We will use the following deﬁnition and
only consider environments where the ﬁrms can be ranked accordingly.
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Deﬁnition 3 We say that ﬁrm 푗 is more productive than ﬁrm 푘 if
휋푗(0) ≥ 휋푘(0) and (9)
푑휋푗(푣)/푑푣 ≥ 푑휋푘(푣)/푑푣 ∀ 푣. (10)
If one of the inequalities is strict, we say that ﬁrm 푗 is strictly more productive than ﬁrm 푘. If
both (9) and (10) hold with equality, then we say that ﬁrms 푗 and 푘 are equally productive.
Equation (9) states that when workers receive zero utility the proﬁts of ﬁrm 푗 are weakly
higher than the proﬁts of ﬁrm 푘. Equation (10) states that the proﬁts of ﬁrm 푗 increase faster
(or drop more slowly) than 푘’s when workers’ utility increases. It immediately follows that for a
given level of worker utility, ﬁrm 푗 makes higher proﬁts than 푘. For example, in the linear proﬁt
functions 휋푗(푣) = 푥푗 − 푣 of Montgomery (1991) and Burdett, Shi and Wright (2001), Deﬁnition
3 translates into our usual notion of being more productive (푥푗 ≥ 푥푘) because the slopes of the
proﬁt functions are identical. Note, however, that Deﬁnition 3 is a strictly stronger requirement
than 휋푗(푣) ≥ 휋푗(푣) for all 푣.
Proving that more productive ﬁrms oﬀer higher utility to prospective employees is straight-
forward in the context of a continuum economy. One need only establish the following simple
single-crossing condition between the probability of hiring, 퐻, and the utility that is oﬀered to
workers, 푣: to “gain” a unit increase in 퐻, a more productive ﬁrm is always willing to raise 푣 by
a larger amount than a less productive ﬁrm. In a continuum economy, this argument is suﬃcient
to show that more productive ﬁrms oﬀer higher utility to workers.
However, this logic does not apply in a ﬁnite economy because a single ﬁrm’s action aﬀects
market outcomes and, in particular, the probability of hiring when making a given oﬀer. Consider
two ﬁrms (say 1 and 2) that currently oﬀer diﬀerent levels of utility (푣1 and 푣2) and are both
contemplating a deviation to some 푣ˆ. The hiring probability that ﬁrm 1 faces if it oﬀers 푣ˆ is
diﬀerent from the one that ﬁrm 2 faces because the overall distribution of oﬀers will be diﬀerent:
if ﬁrm 1 deviates to 푣ˆ then the distribution includes 푣ˆ and 푣2 but not 푣1; if ﬁrm 2 deviates,
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the distribution includes 푣ˆ and 푣1 but not 푣2. Therefore the hiring probability when oﬀering 푣ˆ
depends on which ﬁrm is making that oﬀer. As a result, single-crossing in terms of preferences
is not enough because the “technology” by which a ﬁrm can convert the utility that it oﬀers
into the probability of hiring diﬀers for the diﬀerent ﬁrms. Maybe the easiest way to see that
our main result in Theorem 2 is non-trivial due to the strategic interactions is the observation
that one can construct environments with equilibria that are not characterized by ﬁrst order
conditions where higher productivity ﬁrms indeed pay lower wages (see Example 1 below).
We prove our result for equilibria that are characterized by ﬁrst order conditions, because
our proof relies on a direct comparison of these conditions. However, it is not necessary for
the equilibrium to be characterized by the ﬁrst order conditions and we provide an additional
condition which guarantees that this ﬁrst order approach is valid. The reason why the ﬁrst order
conditions need not hold in equilibrium is that a ﬁrm’s expected proﬁts may contain kinks. To
see this, consider a ﬁrm (say, ﬁrm 1) that oﬀers 푣1 and is active and suppose that some other
ﬁrm (say, ﬁrm 2) oﬀers 푣2 and is on the boundary for being active. Think of how the expected
proﬁts of ﬁrm 1 are aﬀected by a change in 푣1: If ﬁrm 1 reduces its announcement the market
utility will fall and ﬁrm 2 will become active, adding a competitor for workers’ services; this
makes the supply of workers more elastic with respect to the announcement. Formally, in (6)
the strictly negative term 휉2(푣1, 푣2) = 푔(0)푣2 is additionally introduced when ﬁrm 1 reduces its
announcement.15 If ﬁrm 1 increases its oﬀer the market utility will increase, ﬁrm 2 will remain
inactive and the supply of workers will be less elastic with respect to 푣1. This means that the
additional term does not appear in (6). This creates a kink in the expected proﬁts of ﬁrm 1, and
therefore its the optimal choice may not be characterized by a ﬁrst order condition.
The following assumption is suﬃcient to rule out the scenario described above by guaranteeing
that all ﬁrms are active. More precisely, it states that every ﬁrm is active in equilibrium, even
15The term 푔(0) is strictly negative: Since 퐺(푝) is strictly decreasing and continuously diﬀerentiable, we have
푔(0) = lim푝↘0퐺′(푝) ≤ 0. Moreover, the convexity of 퐺(푝) rules out that 푔(0) = 0 as otherwise 푔(푝) ≥ 0 for 푝 > 0,
violating the assumption that 퐺(푝) is strictly decreasing. Finally, in the example 푣1 > 0 (as otherwise ﬁrm 2
could not be inactive, but would be active at any weakly positive announcement), and so for ﬁrm 2 to be on the
brink of becoming active it has to be that 푣2 > 0.
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when all of its competitors oﬀer the maximum individually rational utility.
Assumption 3 푝푗(v) > 0 for all 푗 where v = (푣1, ..., 푣푚).
It is easy to show that Assumption 3 holds as long as the maximum utilities that ﬁrms are willing
to oﬀer are not too far apart, i.e. there exists parameter 훾 < 1 such that Assumption 3 holds
whenever min푗 푣푗 > 훾max푗 푣푗. Note that we only rely on Assumption 3 for the characterization
proof of Section 4 and this assumption is not necessary for our other results.
We now prove that if a low productivity ﬁrm’s ﬁrst order conditions hold and it oﬀers higher
utility than a high productivity ﬁrm then the high productivity ﬁrm’s ﬁrst order conditions are
not satisﬁed. While our equilibrium deﬁnition focuses on pure strategies, note that it does not
restrict identical ﬁrms to oﬀer the same utility to workers. This is one implication of the following
theorem which shows that in equilibrium a more productive ﬁrm necessarily oﬀers higher utility
to workers.
Theorem 2 If Assumption 3 holds, then in any directed search equilibrium 푣푗 > 푣푘 if ﬁrm 푗 is
strictly more productive than ﬁrm 푘 and 푣푗 = 푣푘 if ﬁrm 푗 is equally productive to ﬁrm 푘.
Proof. See Appendix.
We now provide an example where Assumption 3 does not hold and there is an equilibrium
where a high productivity ﬁrm oﬀers a lower wage than a low productivity ﬁrm. We construct it
in the canonical setting of the directed literature with linear production as outlined in Example
1 in Section , which has been the focus e.g. in Moen (1997), Montgomery (1991) and Peters
(2000). Since Assumption 3 holds when all ﬁrms are identical, and since it is easy to show
that with two ﬁrms and linear production the equilibrium is always characterized by ﬁrst order
conditions, we resort to an example which in the end features more than two ﬁrms and ﬁrm
heterogeneity.
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Example 1 To set up the example, consider ﬁrst a simple environment with two risk-neutral
workers and two identical ﬁrms who produce 1 when matched and zero otherwise. The proﬁt of
ﬁrm 푗 is given by 휋푗(푣) = 1 − 푣. It is straightforward to show that the unique directed search
equilibrium has utility oﬀers 푣1 = 푣2 = 1/2 and expected utility for workers of 푈(1/2, 1/2) = 3/8.
Now choose 휖 > 0 and 휅 > 휖 such that at wage proﬁle (푣ˆ1, 푣ˆ2) = (1/2 + 휖, 1/2 + 휅) both
ﬁrms individually prefer to reduce their oﬀers. Choose both 휖 and 휅 small enough such that the
incentives to reduce the wage are small. These parameters exist due to the convexity of the ﬁrms
best response function. If the ﬁrms oﬀer 푣ˆ1 and 푣ˆ2 then workers obtain some expected utility 푈ˆ .
Next, introduce a third ﬁrm with proﬁt function 휋3 = 푈ˆ − 푣 that oﬀers wage 푣ˆ3 = 푈ˆ . In
this extended environment none of the original ﬁrms has any longer an incentive to lower their
utility oﬀer since workers would start applying to the third ﬁrm (the function 푝푗(푣푗, 푣−푗) can be
shown to be non-diﬀerentiable at vˆ because ﬁrm 3 has a non-negligible impact). Therefore, in
the extended environment 푣ˆ1, 푣ˆ2 and 푣ˆ3 constitutes an equilibrium, and the original two ﬁrms
pay diﬀerent wages despite the fact that their proﬁt functions are identical.
By standard upper-hemicontinuity arguments we can slightly improve the productivity of ﬁrm
1 and obtain an equilibrium arbitrarily close to 푣ˆ1, 푣ˆ2 and 푣ˆ3. Since 푣ˆ1 < 푣ˆ2 we end up with an
equilibrium where the higher productivity ﬁrm posts a strictly lower utility. Note that the proof
crucially relies on the non-diﬀerentiability of the proﬁt function at the equilibrium oﬀers.
Examples of this type can be constructed in any setting that fulﬁlls our assumptions on
production and matching. We can ﬁrst look at the case where two ﬁrms have exactly identical
and therefore announce the same value to the workers according to Theorem 2, then introduce
a third ﬁrm with productivity slightly above the announcement of the original ﬁrms and let it
oﬀer its full productivity, then adjust the announcements of the other ﬁrms upward slightly to
set the third ﬁrm exactly at the point of becoming active and therefore none of the original ﬁrms
wants to reduce its oﬀers due to the resulting discontinuity,16 and ﬁnally since preferences are
16In the absence of the third ﬁrm, it is easy to see for example from the proof of the following Theorem 3 that
the original ﬁrms would like to reduce their announcement if we increase it upward from the equilibrium level,
so only the kink induced by the third ﬁrm holds them back.
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strict we can adjust the productivies of the original ﬁrms slightly to unequal levels.
Theorem 2 holds when ﬁrms are homogeneous and it can be used to prove that there is a
unique equilibrium in such a case. In the only related result, Burdett, Shi and Wright (2001)
prove that there is only one equilibrium where all ﬁrms oﬀer the same wage in an environment
with linear production and urn-ball matching. However, they do not examine asymmetric strate-
gies by the (identical) ﬁrms, except for the special 2-ﬁrm 2-worker case. Our previous theorem
establishes that there cannot be equilibria in asymmetric strategies when ﬁrms are homogeneous
and, therefore, the equilibrium in Burdett, Shi and Wright (2001) is unique. Our proof still
includes some additional steps to show that the result holds for general matching functions and
general production technologies.
Theorem 3 When all ﬁrms are equally productive, the directed search equilibrium is unique.
Proof. See Appendix.
5 Competitive Search as a Limit
In this section we present the standard one-shot version of a directed search economy with a
continuum of agents under the market utility property and show that it is the limit of the ﬁnite
game as the number of agents becomes large. This setup encompasses the models described in
Section 2.2. Our exposition is closely related to Peters (1997).
Consider an economy with measure one of ﬁrms and measure 푏 of workers. The workers
are homogeneous and ﬁrms are potentially heterogeneous with types distributed on Θ = [0, 1]
according to probability measure 푃 . When a ﬁrm of type 휃 ∈ Θ ﬁlls its vacancy and pays 푣 to
its worker it makes proﬁts 휋휃(푣), where 휋휃 satisﬁes Assumption 1 and 푣¯ ≡ sup휃∈Θ 푣¯휃 <∞.
The timing of the model is the same as in the ﬁnite case: ﬁrms post announcements, workers
decide where to apply for a job, matching occurs and payoﬀs are realized. The workers’ strategies
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result in an expected queue length 휆 which represents the ratio of the expected number of
applications per ﬁrm at each announcement level 푣 and corresponds to 푛푝푗 in the ﬁnite case.
The probability that a ﬁrm facing queue length 휆 hires a worker is given by 푟푓 (휆) and the
probability that a worker who applies to such a ﬁrm ﬁnds a job is 푟푤(휆), where 푟푤(휆) = 푟푓 (휆)/휆.
Additionally, 푟푓 is strictly increasing and concave, 푟푤 is strictly decreasing and convex and they
are both twice continuously diﬀerentiable.
The queue length across diﬀerent announcements is determined by the market utility property
which is an indiﬀerence condition, similar to equation (1), stating that a worker receives at least
the market utility 푈 when applying to a ﬁrm. An important additional element is that this
relation holds both on and oﬀ the equilibrium path, i.e. it determines a ﬁrm’s hiring probability
from oﬀering some 푣 that is not posted by anyone else:
If 푣 > 푈 then 휆 is s.t. 푟푤(휆)푣 = 푈 , otherwise 휆 = 0. (11)
As in the ﬁnite case, an announcement that is too low (푣 ≤ 푈) receives no applicants (휆 = 0)
and a ﬁrm is active only if 푣 > 푈 . Let 휆(푣, 푈) be the queue length deﬁned by (11). Each ﬁrm
anticipates this relation between the queue length and its announcement, and solves the problem
max
푣
푟푓 (휆(푣, 푈))휋휃(푣) (12)
Deﬁnition 4 (Competitive Search Equilibrium) A competitive search equilibrium comprises
the workers’ market utility 푈∗ and a cumulative distribution of announcements 푌 ∗ such that for
all intervals [푣푙, 푣ℎ] ⊂ ℝ :
푌 ∗(푣ℎ)− 푌 ∗(푣푙) ≤ 푃{휃 ∈ Θ : some 푣 ∈ (푣푙, 푣ℎ] solves (12) for 휃}, (13)
and ∫
휆 (푣, 푈∗) 푑푌 ∗(푣) = 푏. (14)
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The left hand side of equation (13) gives the equilibrium measure of oﬀers in (푣푙, 푣ℎ]. The
right hand side gives the proportion of ﬁrms that ﬁnd it optimal to make an announcement in
(푣푙, 푣ℎ]. If every ﬁrm has a unique announcement, then (13) holds with equality.
17 Equation (14)
ensures that the worker-ﬁrm ratio integrated across all ﬁrms actually adds up to the measure of
workers in the economy. It ensures that the utility that the workers obtain indeed reﬂects their
scarcity.
For some of the convergence results it is more useful to talk about a ﬁrm’s rank in the
distribution. We deﬁne a ﬁrm as being of rank 푥 ∈ [0, 1] if a fraction 푥 of other ﬁrms has
a weakly lower type. We can back out the actual type of the ﬁrm that has rank 푥 as 휏(푥) =
sup{휃 ∈ 휃∣푃 ([0, 휃]) ≤ 푥}). Let Π∗푥 denote the expected proﬁt of a ﬁrm of rank 푥 in the competitive
equilibrium.
We will now explore the connection of this limit game to games of the ﬁnite economy that
we analyzed in Section 3. Consider a ﬁnite economy with 푚 ﬁrms and 푛 = 푏푚 identical workers.
In what follows, we index the variables that refer to the ﬁnite economy by 푚. We label ﬁrms
in the ﬁnite economy by their rank in the productivity distribution, so that ﬁrm 푗 is of rank
푗/푚. Furthermore, we assume that the rank remains unchanged as the economy grow in that
it coincides with that of ﬁrm of type 휏(푗/푚) in the limit economy. Therefore, by construction
the distribution of types in the ﬁnite economy converges weakly to the type distribution in the
limit economy. Theorem 1 proves that the ﬁnite economy has a pure strategy equilibrium. Let
푌푚 denote the distribution of announcements for that equilibrium, 푈푚 the market utility of the
workers and Π푚,푥 the expected proﬁt of ﬁrm 푗 = 푚푥.
In the ﬁnite game we have some trading probabilities given by 퐻(푝) and 퐺(푝) when workers
apply with probability 푝 to a ﬁrm, where 퐻 and 퐺 fulﬁll Assumption 2. The matching proba-
bilities change when we increase the number of workers 푛, and to make this dependence obvious
17In principle, a ﬁrm could earn maximum proﬁts from several distinct announcements, which is why (13) has
a weak inequality. To see that (13) always holds with equality if each ﬁrm type has a unique optimum, observe
the following. If the inequality were strict for some interval [푣푙, 푣ℎ] then for the union of [푣푙, 푣ℎ] and [0, 푣¯]∖[푣푙, 푣ℎ]
the left hand side of (13) is 1 but the right hand side would have to add to more than 1, violating the requirement
that 푃 is a probability measure.
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we can write 퐻(푛, 푝) and 퐺(푛, 푝).18 Intuitively, 푛푝 reﬂects the expected number of workers at
this ﬁrm. We will consider matching functions 푟푤 and 푟푓 that can be approached as the limits
of 퐻 and 퐺 as 푛 → ∞ keeping 푛푝 = 휆. It is easy to see that any pair 푟푤 and 푟푓 that ful-
ﬁlls Assumption 2 (when 푝 is replaced by 휆) can be approached by some sequence of functions
퐻(푛, 푝) and 퐺(푛, 푝) that fulﬁll Assumption 2. Since Assumption 2 is quite general, this includes
most matching functions that have been used in the literature. In particular, the limit matching
functions of the examples in section 4 are included, which in particular rationalizes the following
diﬀerent limit matching technologies that have both diﬀerent levels and elasticities:
Example M1 : 푟푓 (휆) = 1− 푒−휆 = lim
푛→∞∣푛푝=휆
1− (1− 푝)푛;
Example M2 : 푟푓 (휆) = 1− 푒−(1−휏)휆 = lim
푛→∞∣푛푝=휆
1− (1− 푝)푛;
Example M3 (for 푛¯ = 2): 푟푓 (휆) = (1− 푒−휆 − 휆푒−휆)(1− 휏 2) + 휆푒−휆(1− 휏);
First Example M4 : 푟푓 (휆) =
휆
푙 + 휆
= lim
푛→∞∣푛푝=휆
푛푝
푙 + 푛푝
;
Second Example M4 : 푟푓 (휆) = (1 + 휆
−휎)−1/휎 = lim
푛→∞∣푛푝=휆
(1 + (푛푝)−휎)−1/휎.
We will show that an allocation that can be supported for the limit of ﬁnite games constitutes
a competitive search equilibrium, and vice versa. The following result shows the payoﬀs of
workers and ﬁrms converge for large 푚 to those in the limit economy, which implicitly means
that the equilibrium matching probabilities converge.
Theorem 4 For any convergent subsequence of equilibria such that 푌푚 → 푌 ∗ there exists 푈∗
such that {푈∗, 푌 ∗} constitutes a competitive search equilibrium, and expected utilities converge
(푈푚 → 푈∗) as well as expected proﬁts (Π푚,푥 → Π∗푥). Conversely, for any competitive search
equilibrium {푈∗, 푌 ∗} there exists a subsequence of equilibria such that 푌푚 → 푌 ∗, 푈푚 → 푈∗, and
Π푚,푥 → Π∗푥.
Proof. The analysis for the subgame against a convergent distribution 푌푚 → 푌 ∗ of (possibly
18It is more convenient to index these probability by 푛. Of course, this is identical to indexing them by 푚 since
푛 = 푏푚.
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non-equilibrium) oﬀers follows directly from Peters (1997), Theorem 3 and Theorem 4.19 He
characterizes the payoﬀs for the ﬁrms that oﬀer any of the wages in 푌푚. Peters (1997, p. 256)
lays out that his equivalence theorems extend directly to convergence of ﬁnite equilibria if the
ﬁnite equilibria exist in pure posting strategies (because in this case the equilibrium can be
represented as a step function 푌푚). Our Theorem 1 establishes such existence in pure posting
strategies.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we consider ﬁnite directed search economies with heterogeneous ﬁrms, homogeneous
workers and general production and matching structures. We characterize the response by
workers to changes in the oﬀers by ﬁrms and prove the existence of subgame perfect Nash
equilibria in pure ﬁrm strategies. In addition to being interesting in its own right, this result
is useful in a number of ways. Proving the convergence of ﬁnite equilibria to the continuum
economies becomes relatively straightforward (Section 5), showing that the competitive search
models that have been considered in the literature have solid micro-foundations. Furthermore,
a more complete characterization of the equilibrium set is feasible (Section 4) and examining
the eﬃciency properties of the ﬁnite economy becomes easier (Galenianos, Kircher and Virag
(2010), for the special case of linear production).
A number of questions remain open for this class of models. The cardinality of the pure
strategy equilibrium set has not been characterized (especially as concerns uniqueness) while
the existence of non-degenerate mixed strategy equilibria has not been proved or disproved. A
diﬀerent research direction would be to introduce heterogeneity on the worker side. With two-
sided heterogeneity one can address questions regarding the sorting patterns between workers
and ﬁrms. This question has been examined in continuum models by Shi (2001), Shimer (2005)
and Eeckhout and Kircher (2010) but, to our knowledge, only Peters (2009) has made progress
19The proofs in Peters (1997) work with the function 퐻(푛, 푝) = 1− (1− 푝)푛, but straightforward replacement
by the general functional form 퐻(푛, 푝) shows convergence for more general matching functions.
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in analyzing a ﬁnite economy.20
Manolis Galenianos, Pennsylvania State University, USA.
Philipp Kircher, London School of Economics and Political Science, UK, and University of
Pennsylvania, USA.
20Peters (2009) considers the game among heterogeneous workers for given wage oﬀers by ﬁrms, while strategic
decisions of the ﬁrms are not analyzed for ﬁnite numbers. He does integrate ﬁrms’ decisions in a limit game.
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7 Appendix
Lemma 2.
Proof. We show that the partial derivatives translate into equation (6). (See Korn and Korn
(1968) for the relevant matrix algebra). 퐷pF is a matrix with elements 훼푠푠 = 휉푠(v) and
훼푠푙 = −휉푙(v) for 푠 ∈ {1, ..., 푙 − 1}, 훼푙푠 = 1 for 푠 ∈ {1, ..., 푙} and 훼푠푘 = 0 otherwise. To
calculate the determinant ∣퐷pF∣ we use Laplace’s development to expand the last row and ob-
tain ∣퐷pF∣ =
∑푙
푠=1 Λ푙푠, where Λ푙푠 is the cofactor to element 훼푙푠. That is, Λ푙푠 = (−1)푙+푠∣푄푙푠∣,
where 푄푙푠 is the matrix resulting from 퐷pF by elimination of the 푙th row and the 푠th col-
umn. Since 푄푙푙 is a diagonal matrix we have ∣푄푙푙∣ =
∏
푘∈퐿(v)∖{푙} 휉푘(v). For 푠 < 푙 we expand
the 푠 th row of ∣푄푙푠∣ which yields ∣푄푙푠∣ = (−1)푙−1+푠(−휉푙(v))∣퐵푙푠∣, where 퐵푙푠 is a (푙 − 2)2 -
dimensional diagonal matrix with diagonal elements 휉푘(푤) for all 푘 ∈ 퐴(v)∖{푠, 푙}. We therefore
have ∣푄푙푠∣ = (−1)푙+푠
∏
푘∈퐴(v)∖{푠} 휉푘(v), which yields that ∣퐷pF∣ =
∑푙
푠=1
∏
푘∈퐴(v)∖{푠} 휉푘(v).
Next, consider the matrix 퐷vp = −(퐷pF)−1퐷vF of partial derivatives. As an implication
of Cramer’s Rule (퐷pF)
−1 = ∣퐷pF∣−1퐶, where 퐶 is the matrix with elements 훾푗푠 = Λ푠푗. The
Jacobian with respect to the exogenous variables 퐷vF evaluated at (p(v),v) is simply a diag-
onal matrix except for the last column, with elements 훽푠푠 = 퐺(푝푠(v)) and 훽푠푙 = −퐺(푝푙(v)) for
푠 ∈ {1, .., 푙 − 1} and zeros elsewhere. We therefore have ∂푝푗(v)/∂푣푗 = −Λ푗푗∣퐷pF∣−1퐺(푝푗(v)).
This follows immediately for 푗 ∈ {1, .., 푙 − 1}, and holds for 푗 = 푙 by symmetry which is
cumbersome but straightforward to verify analytically. Since the cofactor Λ푗푗 has a simi-
lar structure as the determinant ∣퐷pF∣ only with row and column 푗 missing, we have Λ푗푗 =∑
푠∈퐴(v)∖{푗}
∏
푘∈퐴(v)∖{푗,푠} 휉푘(v), and we obtain
∂푝푗(v)
∂푣푗
= −
∑
푠∈퐴(v)∖{푗}
∏
푘∈퐴(v)∖{푗,푠} 휉푘(v)∑
푠∈퐴(v)
∏
푘∈퐴(v)∖{푠} 휉푘(v)
퐺(푝푗(v)). (15)
Equation (6) follows then from simple algebraic manipulations.
Lemma 3.
Proof. Fix v−푗. We ﬁrst consider 푣ˆ푗 ∈ Ψ푗(v−푗), i.e. points where the workers reaction is not
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diﬀerentiable. We have already established there is only a ﬁnite number of such points. At these
points the concavity of 푝푗(푣푗,v−푗) follows trivially because a decrease in the announcement by
ﬁrm 푗 increases other ﬁrms’ expected number of applicants, while an increase does not. That
is, by continuity of 푝푗(⋅), 휉푗(⋅) and 퐺(⋅) equation (15) implies that lim푣푗↗푣ˆ푗 ∂푝푗(푣푗,v−푗)/∂푣푗 <
lim푣푗↘푣ˆ푗 ∂푝푗(푣푗,v−푗)/∂푣푗.
The remaining task is to show that 푝푗(푣푗,v−푗) is strictly concave for 푣ˆ푗 ∈ Ω푗(v−푗). Recall
that 푇푗(v) = −휉푗(v) − 푋푗(v) where 푋푗(v) = 1/
∑
푘∈퐴(v)∖{푗}
1
휉푘(v)
. We diﬀerentiate (15) with
respect to 푣푗 to obtain the following:
∂2푝푗
∂푣2푗
= − 1
푇 2푗
(
푔(푝푗)
∂푝푗
∂푣푗
[푋푗 + 푣푗]−퐺(푝푗)
[
푔′(푝푗)
∂푝푗
∂푣푗
푣푗 + 푔(푝푗) +
∂푋푗
∂푣푗
])
, (16)
where v is omitted for brevity. We now show that (16) is strictly negative. We split the term in
the round bracket into three parts, 퐵1, 퐵2 and 퐵3, and show that each is non-negative.
The ﬁrst part is given by 퐵1 = 푔(푝푗) [∂푝푗/∂푣푗] 푋푗 and it is strictly positive because 푔(푝푗)
and 푋푗 are strictly negative. Part 퐵2 is given by
퐵2 = 푔(푝푗)
∂푝푗
∂푣푗
푣푗 − 퐺(푝푗)
[
푔′(푝푗)
∂푝푗
∂푣푗
푣푗 + 푔(푝푗)
]
.
Rearranging the above and using (15) yields
퐵2 = 퐺(푝푗)푣푗[2푔(푝푗)
2 − 푔′(푝푗) 퐺(푝푗)] +푋푗푔(푝푗)퐺(푝푗).
The last term is positive so we only need to show that term in the square bracket is positive,
which holds exactly when 1/퐺(푝) is convex.
Finally, consider 퐵3 = −퐺(푝푗)[∂푋푗/∂푣푗]. Note that
∂푋푗
∂푣푗
= 푋2푗
[ ∑
푘∈퐴(v)∖{푗}
푔′(푝푘)
푔(푝푘)2푣푘
∂푝푘
∂푣푗
]
,
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Since ∂푝푘/∂푣푗 ≤ 0 for 푘 ∕= 푗 and 푔′(푝푘) ≥ 0, due to the convexity of 퐺(푝), we have shown that
퐵3 is non-negative.
Theorem 2.
Proof. Under Assumption 3, 퐴(v) = 푀 and the announcement of every ﬁrm is characterized
by its ﬁrst order condition:
∂Π푗
∂푣푗
= 퐻(푝푗)
푑휋푗(푣푗)
푑푣푗
+ ℎ(푝푗)휋푗(푣푗)
∂푝푗
∂푣푗
= 0 ∀ 푗 ∈푀. (17)
From now on we focus on ﬁrms 1 and 2 without loss of generality. Let ﬁrm 1 be strictly
more productive than ﬁrm 2. The proof proceeds by contradiction. Assume 푣1 ≤ 푣2 (the proof
for equal productivities and 푣1 < 푣2 is analogous). Under this assumption we will show that
∂Π2/∂푣2 = 0 and then ∂Π1/∂푣1 > 0, which contradicts proﬁt maximization for ﬁrm 1 and proves
that 푣1 > 푣2 is a necessary condition for equilibrium.
We proceed by assuming 푣1 ≤ 푣2. To compare the ﬁrst order conditions of ﬁrms 1 and 2 we
can work with the following two sets of inequalities:
푑휋1(푣1)
푑푣1
≥ 푑휋2(푣1)
푑푣2
≥ 푑휋2(푣2)
푑푣2
, (18)
휋1(푣1) ≥ 휋2(푣1) ≥ 휋2(푣2). (19)
The ﬁrst inequality of equations (18) and (19) is due to ﬁrm 1 being more productive and at least
one of them has to hold strictly (according to Deﬁnition 3). The second inequality of equation
(18) is due to the (weak) concavity of 휋푗(⋅). The second inequality of equation (19) is due to the
fact that 휋푗(푣푗) is decreasing in 푣푗 in the relevant range.
Rearranging equation (17) yields
푑휋푗(푣푗)
푑푣푗
+
ℎ(푝푗)
퐻(푝푗)
∂푝푗
∂푣푗
휋푗(푣푗) = 0. (20)
If the term multiplying 휋푗(푣푗) is higher for ﬁrm 1 than for ﬁrm 2, then the ﬁrst derivative of ﬁrm
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1 is strictly positive when 푣1 ≤ 푣2 which proves our result. Using equation (6) we can rewrite:
ℎ(푝푗)
퐻(푝푗)
∂푝푗
∂푣푗
= − ℎ(푝푗)
퐻(푝푗)
퐺(푝푗)
∑
푠∈푀∖{푗}
∏
푘∈푀∖{푗,푠} 휉푘∑
푠∈푀
∏
푘∈푀∖{푠} 휉푘
. (21)
Note that the last term has the same denominator for all 푗. Therefore we need only show that
ℎ(푝1)퐺(푝1)
퐻(푝1)
∑
푠 ∕=1
∏
푘 ∕∈{1,푠}
∣푔(푝푘)∣푣푘 ≥ ℎ(푝2)퐺(푝2)
퐻(푝2)
∑
푠 ∕=2
∏
푘 ∕∈{2,푠}
∣푔(푝푘)∣푣푘 (22)
recalling that 휉푘 ≡ 푔(푝푘)푣푘 and 푔(푝푘) < 0. The assumption that 푣1 ≤ 푣2 implies 푝1 ≤ 푝2
and hence ℎ(푝1 ≥ ℎ(푝2) , 퐻(푝1) ≤ 퐻(푝2) and 퐺(푝1) ≥ 퐺(푝2). The term
∏
푘/∈{1,2} ∣푔(푝푘))∣푣푘 is
contained inside the summation in both sides of inequality (22). It is therefore suﬃcient to show:
ℎ(푝1)퐺(푝1)
퐻(푝1)
∣푔(푝2)∣푣2 ≥ ℎ(푝2)퐺(푝2)
퐻(푝2)
∣푔(푝1)∣푣1. (23)
Subgame equilibrium implies that 푣2/푣1 = 퐺(푝1)/퐺(푝2)). Together with 퐺(푝푗) = 퐻(푝푗)/(푛푝푗)
and ∣푔(푝푗)∣ = [퐺(푝푗) + ℎ(푝푗)/푛]/푝, inequality (23) reduces to
퐺(푝2) + ℎ(푝2)/푛
퐺(푝2)ℎ(푝2)/푛
≥ 퐺(푝1) + ℎ(푝1)/푛
퐺(푝1)ℎ(푝1)/푛
.
If 푅(푝) ≡ 퐺(푝)−1 + 푛ℎ(푝)−1 is strictly increasing in 푝 we have our result. Diﬀerentiation yields
푅′(푝) = −퐺(푝)−2푔(푝)−푛ℎ(푝)−2ℎ′(푝) which is strictly positive for any 푝 ∈ (0, 1) because ℎ′(푝) ≤ 0
and 푔(푝) < 0.
Theorem 3.
Proof. When all ﬁrms are equally productive Assumption 3 holds and in equilibrium all ﬁrms
oﬀer the same level of utility by Theorem 2. As a result, 푝푗 = 1/푚 for all 푗 ∈ 푀 in all
possible equilibria. Suppose there are two candidate equilibria 퐴 and 퐵 where ﬁrms oﬀer 푣퐴
and 푣퐵 > 푣퐴, respectively, and consider the ﬁrms’ ﬁrst order conditions. The terms 퐻(푝) and
ℎ(푝) are the same in both candidate equilibria. The concavity of the proﬁt function implies that
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푑휋(푣퐴)/푑푣퐴 ≥ 푑휋(푣퐵)/푑푣퐵. Proﬁts are a decreasing function of oﬀered utility in 풱 which implies
that 휋(푣퐴) > 휋(푣퐵). Finally, ∂푝푗/∂푣퐴 > ∂푝푗/∂푣퐵 follows from equation (15): 퐺(푝) and 푔(푝) are
the same in both equilibria and 푇푗(v퐴) < 푇푗(v퐵).
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